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Interagency Group/Countermeasures

Washington, D.C. 20505

* D/ICS-84-0804
9 April 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees


FROM:


Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Final Minutes of Eleventh IG/CM Meeting,
13 March 1984

Attached are final minutes of the eleventh IG/CM meeting held on 13 March 25X1
1984. (U)

Attachment:
a/s




OSD Review Completed.

State Dept. review completed

Regraded Unclassified when
attachment is removed.

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CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN**SUMMARY OF IG/CM MEETING****13 March 1984****Room 6W02,**

25X1

1. The eleventh meeting of the IG/CM was convened at 1400 hours, 13 March 1984, by the Chairman (DUSD-Policy), General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.). A list of individuals attending is at Attachment 1. (U)

2. The Chairman made the following opening remarks:

a. The DoJ-prepared personnel security paper, considered at the last IG/CM meeting, has been forwarded to the SIG-I. The paper is scheduled to be a SIG-I agenda item, but a SIG-I meeting date has yet to be announced. (U)

b. A paper of major significance has recently been released by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The paper, which discusses new security clearance procedures, has major implications for DoD. The Chairman urged attendees to obtain and review the paper. DoD is presently developing its position vis-a-vis the OPM paper. (U)

c. The IG/CM-approved amplification of procedures for preparation of damage assessments has been forwarded to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) for incorporation as a supplement to ISOO Directive 1. (U)

d. DoD representatives have participated in three Congressional hearings on use of the polygraph in DoD. Both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have given the DoD polygraph program favorable reception. The Chairman opined that this is a good indicator that the Congressionally imposed moratorium on DoD actions vis-a-vis the polygraph may not be continued. (U)

3. The Chairman reviewed the principal agenda items of NATO security and embassy security, introduced each of two individuals who had consented to brief on these issues, and thanked them for sharing their valuable time with the IG/CM.

a. Mr. Terence Shea, Director, NATO Office of Security (NOS), addressed the IG/CM on the role of his office and various security initiatives taken. Mr. Shea advised that he is a US citizen but would speak in large part as an international employee of NATO. He provided an overview of the NATO environment and structure, emphasizing the difference between NATO as a headquarters entity and the individual 16 NATO nations which make up NATO. (The NOS can have a direct influence

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over the former, but individual national security services must deal with the latter.) He was particularly concerned that this distinction be made whenever news of a security incident was surfaced. In his opinion, the phrase "NATO is a sieve" is often misapplied in that security incidents more frequently involve the individual countries of NATO rather than NATO as a headquarters. He nevertheless acknowledged that NATO Headquarters does have security problems but significant improvements are occurring. He highlighted his ability to directly access the NATO Secretary General and the support the Secretary General has provided in strengthening the role of the NOS. Mr. Shea provided several examples of improved capabilities and influence which have changed NOS from a mere security regulation writing office into one actively involved in security implementation. He stressed that much of the success in this area is due not only to the support of the NATO Secretary General but also to the assignment on his staff of intelligence professionals with experience in CI and security matters. Mr. Shea sees this more pro-active involvement of NOS as a very positive step toward reducing both the fact and perception that security at NATO Headquarters is weak. He indicated a willingness to continue to keep US officials apprised of both the positive and negative aspects of the NATO security situation. In this regard, he stressed his cooperation with the US representatives to the NATO Security and Special Security Committees, as well as his liaison and consultation with other in-country US officials. A lack of time precluded substantive questions from IG/CM membership. (C/NF)

b. Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, Coordinator for Security Policies and Programs for the Department of State, provided an informational review of the responsibilities of that office. Ambassador Sayre, indicated that his office, which emphasizes only the policy, planning, and preparedness aspects, does not have complete responsibility for security of US embassies overseas. The bulk of operational aspects of security are carried out under the auspices of the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. Nevertheless, Ambassador Sayre advised he wears many hats, to include that of Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism and Chairman of the Interagency Group on Terrorism. For the past two and one-half years he has been pulling together bits of policy governing how the US can improve the protection of humans overseas in an attempt to articulate a more coherent and strong policy. In October 1982, such a strategy was promulgated and it now applies to all US embassies worldwide. His task now has become follow-up to ensure that responsible offices properly budget for the resources required to deal with that aspect of embassy security. Additionally, a more recently assigned task is that of ensuring that all US embassies and consulates have a workable Emergency Action Plan (EAP). Efforts in this regard include holding EAP seminars for deputy chiefs of missions and conducting tests of EAPs. Ambassador Sayre also advised that in 1983 Congress approved US training of foreign law enforcement personnel to help them deal with terrorism overseas. His office manages this program. The theory is if foreign officials are properly trained, they can better take

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care of themselves without further US assistance and better assist the US in times of US crisis in the host country. A goal is to develop a worldwide network of officials trained under the same doctrine to facilitate actions in a crisis. Multiple US agencies are involved in this training program. Ambassador Sayre summarized by indicating that full improvement of our system to provide protection of US personnel overseas is not yet complete but many actions such as those described are ongoing. Most questions following Ambassador Sayre's briefing were found to be more properly directed to the Department of State's Office of Security. The IG/CM Chairman thanked Ambassador Sayre for the insightful overview. (C)

4. The Chairman asked the IG/CM Secretary to discuss the final agenda item. A memorandum from the Executive Secretary was distributed. The Secretary explained that the memo contained a collated list of issues on which IG/CM action was explicitly or implicitly suggested. The sources of these issues were various national-level studies, assessments, or minutes of IG/CM deliberations. The Secretary suggested a need to obtain a consensus on the priority to be given to listed issues so as to better structure an IG/CM work plan. The Chairman asked all attendees to study the list carefully. He further directed the Secretary to prepare a proposed list of priority issues and to circulate the suggested list as a proposed agenda for the subsequent meeting in time to accommodate feedback from IG/CM members. (U)

ACTION: The IG/CM Secretary is to select three or four issues from each of the three listed categories and propose them as agenda items for the twelfth meeting of the IG/CM. Members are to comment on the selected priority prior to the meeting date so as to develop an agreed agenda. (U)

7. The meeting adjourned at 1545. (U)

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Attachment 1

ATTENDEES

IG/CM Meeting, 13 March 1984

Room 6W02,

25X1

NAMEORGANIZATION

STILWELL, Richard G.
 SNIDER, L. Britt
 ANDERSON, Maynard


OSD
 OSD
 OSD



CIA
 CIA
 CIA
 CIA
 NSA
 NSA

YEE, Edwin
 DILL, Frank
 BERKIN, Gerald
 PASEUR, George
 GREISEN, Bruce R.

FBI
 Army
 Navy
 Air Force
 Marine Corps



DIA

HEICHLER, Lucian
 WHARTON, Royal
 SAYRE, Ambassador Robert M.
 PAPENDORP, Theodore
 LAWTON, Mary C.
 LEIDENHEIMER, Robert E.
 WINGFIELD, Robert L.
 WELLS, Robert W.
 HAAS, James L.
 SHEA, Terrence
 CASSIS, George

State
 State
 State
 State
 Justice
 SECDEF
 DoE
 ISOO
 Coast Guard
 NATO
 NATO

Secretariat

IG/CM
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STAT CCIS/ICS:

Distribution of Final Minutes of Eleventh IG/CM Meeting (D/ICS-84-0804):

1 - Gen. Stilwell, OSD
5 - Mr. Snider, OSD (to be distributed to Army, Navy, Air Force and
Marine Corps)
1 - Mr. Du Hadway, FBI
STAT 1 -
1 - Mr. Heichler, State
STAT 1 -
1 - Mr. deGraffenreid, NSC
STAT 1 - (for JCS)
1 - Mr. Leidenheimer, SECOM
1 - Ms. Lawton, DoJ
1 - Mr. McBrien, Treasury
1 - Mr. Peterson, Commerce
1 - Mr. Wingfield, Energy
1 - Mr. Krohn, FAA
1 - CAPT Peebles, Coast Guard
1 - Mr. Garfinkel, ISOO
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/ICS (via DD/ICS)
1 - ICS Registry
1 - IG/CM subject
1 - IG/CM chrono

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CONFIDENTIAL**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET****SUBJECT:** (Optional)**Final Minutes of the Eleventh
IG/CM Meeting, 13 March 1984****FROM:****Policy and Plans Group/OS
6S-04,****EXTENSION****NO.****DATE**

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)**DATE****RECEIVED****FORWARDED****OFFICER'S
INITIALS****COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)1. DDI/FIC
2F-24, Hdqs.
Attn: [redacted]

2.

3. DDO/CI staff
2C-33, Hdqs.
Attn: [redacted]

4.

5. DDS&T/A
6E-38, Hdqs.
Attn: [redacted]

6.

7. C/COMSEC/OC
2B-07, [redacted]
Attn: [redacted]

8.

9. DD/PTAS
202 [redacted]
Attn: C/ISSG, C/TSD
10. and C/PSD (for C/ISB)

11.

12.

13.

14.

**15. WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED**

Attached for your information are the final minutes of the Eleventh Interagency Group/Countermeasures meeting, held on 13 March 1984.

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FORM 1-79 **610** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS**CONFIDENTIAL**

GPO : 1983 0 - 411-632